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abstract This paper focuses on the potential reconfiguration of constituent power in the 
context of multinational States. It takes the view that sub-state claims pose relevant chal-
lenges to the traditional vision of constituent power as a unitary and monolithic essence. 
This seems all the more topical in Spain, where the Spanish Constitutional Court adheres to 
a unitary conception of constituent power. By contrast, our research has looked at whether 
and to what extent it is possible to accept that such a unitary vision of constituent power 
may be challenged with the emergence of new social forces calling into question the ultimate 
allocation of competence. The so-called sovereignty process in Catalonia invites constitutional 
scholars to engage in this debate, particularly in the light of the last unilateral referendum 
on independence from Spain that took place on 1st October 2017. Whereas the referendum 
has often been framed within the so-called theory of the right to decide, we ask whether 
it is possible to understand it instead as an expression of an emerging constituent power.
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1. Introduction
What is the meaning of constituent power today? Is this concept stuck with 
its original meaning or is there room to reconsider its relevance in current 
legal debates? First and foremost, it is not rare to come across scholars who 
urge an abandoning of the study of constituent power, arguing that it drives 
jurists from the field of law and into the domain of political fact.1 Never-
theless, the significance of constituent power appears today as the object of 
numerous attempts at reconceptualization. Recent investigations, moreover, 
illustrate the emergence of new cleavages that overlap with earlier ones.2 Two 
intertwined phenomena seem recently to challenge the classical assumptions 
of constituent power: first, the people’s plea for a democratization of the 
political process and, second, the pluralisation of decision-making centres. 
On the one hand, social movements call into question the legitimacy of the 
authority of decisions. This is perhaps evident in the context of financial 
crisis-era protests against neoliberal policies.3 On the other hand the “locus”4 
of constituent power, i.e. where it lies, is subject to constant debate. A par-
allel attempt to consider the multiplicity of constituent powers is currently 
in the works, both in the supra- or international arena and the subnational 
one. This is just to show that far from being a dormant concept, there are 
many attempts afoot to reconsider the value of constituent power at present 
(see below). 
One of the main conundrums posed by the notion of constituent power 
is defining which subjects are those entitled to trigger a new constituent 
process. Among the different perspectives that have taken shape over the 
years — from normativism to decisionism5 —  this paper adheres to those 
which emphasise the strict relationship between constituent power and the 
current challenges to pluralist and plurinational societies. In this regard, the 
works of prominent scholars such as Peter Häberle or more recently Martin 
Loughlin may represent a meaningful point of reference to the extent that 
1. See for this account Dyzenhaus, “Constitutionalism in an Old Key”, 229-260. 
2. Walker, “The return of constituent power”, 906-913. 
3. See Pisarello, Procesos constituyentes, 115 ff.
4. For this expression, see Krisch, “Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postna-
tional order”. 
5. For a comprehensive account, see Loughlin, “The concept of constituent power”, 219 ff. 
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both highlight the importance of the open, dynamic and undefined nature of 
constituent power. Häberle rejects the idea of the people as a unitary entity 
and draws attention to the multiple actors that shape the constituent process6. 
More recently, Loughlin conceptualized a “relational approach”, according 
to which “constituent power is not engaged only at the (virtual) founding 
moment but continues to function within an established regime as an expres-
sion of the open, provisional and dynamic aspects of constitutional ordering”. 
Such a definition may be useful for the purposes of this paper to the extent 
that it refuses to identify constituent power with the constitution itself or 
with any given and aprioristic political entity. By contrast, understanding 
the “open, provisional and dynamic aspects” of constituent power allows us 
to consider the inextinguishable nature of the subject of constituent power 
and the possibility that in the evolution of a given political community the 
legitimacy of the constituted powers can be put into question.
In order to problematize certain classical assumptions about pouvoir con-
stituant some of the aspects which historically inform the concept must be 
considered.7 On the one hand, constituent power has traditionally been qual-
ified as unlimited and extra-legal.8 However, a countervailing phenomenon 
illustrates the possibility of transforming such a feature, for there are two 
points which have yet to be demonstrated. The first is that constituent pow-
er necessarily involves the exercise of an exclusively political force which 
operates outside the scope of the legal framework, and, second, that such a 
force can be considered unlimited or disruptive. Indeed the opposite has been 
shown by recent constitution-making processes, such as those that occurred 
in Eastern Europe9 and have to a certain extent illustrated that constituent 
6. Häberle, Potere costituente, especially at 4 for the juxtaposition between “the will of the 
constituent” (in singular that he rejects) and the pluralism of the constituents (in plural), which 
characterizes the notion of constituent power in the contemporary constitutional State.
7. On the traditional debate and definition of the pouvoir constituent, see Sieyès, Qu’est-ce 
que le Tiers-État?; Hauriou, Précis élémentaire de droit constitutionnel; Kelsen, Teoría pura del 
Derecho; Schmitt, Teoría de la constitución, Lasalle, ¿Qué es una Constitución? And see also Carré 
de Malberg, Contribution à la théorie générale de l’État; Jellinek, Théorie générale de l’État and 
Fragmentos de Estado. 
8. Cristi, “Carl Schmitt on sovereignty and constituent power”, 189-201.
9. For this account, see Palermo, “Dichiarazione di indipendenza del Kosovo e potere cos-
tituente nella prospettiva della Corte internazionale di Giustizia”:  “Il potere costituente 
non è più qualcosa che possa esaurirsi in un unico atto. Esso si esercita, piuttosto, in modo 
graduale, per atti incrementali e successivi, attraverso una combinazione di atti e fatti di 
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power can be expressed through a progression of acts or events involving 
both internal and international actors. In that context, it seems also relevant 
to stress that — for the same reason — the very identification of the constit-
uent process is perhaps worthy of debate, as nuanced by the phases that, ex 
post, can be referred to as exercises of constituent power.10  
Furthermore, that the unitary or monistic character of constituent power, 
seen to express the will of the nation, is aligned with the very origin of the 
concept, has heretofore been taken for granted. Yet, it goes without saying 
that the current form of the State has deeply evolved since the emergence of 
the concept of constituent power.11 In particular, contemporary constitution-
alism has been conceived through the same lens of pluralism that prompted 
the definition of a new type of State, according to the prevailing historical 
classification of the form of the State. Since the progressive affirmation of 
pluralism in modern and contemporary democratic regimes it has been pos-
sible to reframe several constitutional concepts under the light of pluralism. 
Federations admit the coexistence of constitutions and constitutional courts 
within the same unity. Rights can either be granted under the constitution of 
the State or according to sub-state constitutions and, to a certain degree, sub-
state standards may be higher than those enshrined by the national Constitu-
tion. In this context, it is perhaps worthwhile to ask whether pluralism also 
calls into question the historical unitary assumption of constituent power 
and, in turn, attempts to put together a pluralist vision of constituent power. 
Such is the conceptual framework adopted by this paper in an effort to ul-
timately analyse the current Spanish debate over the constitutional future 
of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia from Spain. On the one hand, 
constituent power has been identified as existing within the Spanish people. 
rilievo costituzionale, con strumenti che non si esauriscono nel lavoro di un’assemblea elet-
tiva ma coinvolgono attori di legittimazione diversa (in primis internazionali), e rendono 
difficile operare una distinzione netta tra il prima e il dopo. Tale complessità e gradualità. 
nell’esercizio del potere costituente fa sì che la dottrina più. accorta distingua ormai tra 
processo costituente ed evento costituente, e tra potere costituente e funzione costituente. Il 
processo costituente, insomma, pur nella diversità di ciascuna esperienza, tende a caratter-
izzarsi come processo conoscibile, giuridicamente guidato, garantito, procedimentalizzato 
e pluralista. Tutto l’opposto rispetto al potere costituente tradizionale, libero nei fini e nelle 
forme, esercitato in via esclusivamente politica”.
10. Ibidem. 
11. See Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU. 
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As a matter of fact, Article 1.2 lays out that national sovereignty relies on 
the Spanish people, a unit from which all State powers emanate. The Con-
stitutional Court echoed this position in several judgements.12 However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the prevailing interpretation of Art. 1.2 CE 
is now challenged by sizeable movements in Catalan society which defend 
their claims by asserting the existence of a strong democratic aspiration in 
opposition to the traditional reading of the Spanish Constitution. Political 
and academic debates have often understood the legitimacy of that claim 
on the grounds of the so-called “right to decide”, the origins of which — 
according to a part of the doctrine that backs it — may be traced to the 
constitutional text itself.13 In this paper it will be argued that the theoretical 
framework within which the secessionist claims must be framed is different 
from the one adopted by the theorization of the right to decide. Both per-
spectives have common features, insofar as they challenge a monistic con-
ception of sovereignty and emphasize a procedural conception of democ-
racy, which relies on the potentialities of triggering negotiations between 
the countervailing actors. However, the theory of the right to decide insists 
on a somewhat legalistic approach, anchoring the claim for a potential new 
institutional framework for Catalonia in the principles enshrined in the 
Spanish Constitution. Unlike the latter approach, the constituent-power 
perspective allows us to shift the focus from legality to legitimacy and 
to consider that the core issue here is to assess whether it is admissible to 
12. See STC 103/2008, FJ 4, where the Court stated the following: “La Ley recurrida pre-
supone la existencia de un sujeto, el “pueblo vasco”, titular de un “derecho a decidir” suscep-
tible de ser “ejercitado” [art. 1 b) de la Ley impugnada], equivalente al titular de la soberanía, 
el pueblo español, y capaz de negociar con el Estado constituido por la Nación española los 
términos de una nueva relación entre éste y una de las Comunidades Autónomas en las que 
se organiza. La identificación de un sujeto institucional dotado de tales cualidades y competencias 
resulta, sin embargo, imposible sin una reforma previa de la Constitución vigente” (emphasis add-
ed). See also STC 42/2014 where the Court affirmed that the right to decide was conceivable 
as a political ambition that may be reached through the legal avenues provided by the Spanish 
constitutional system (see FJ4). For a remarkable study on the relationships between Consti-
tutional Courts and secession see Martinico, “Identity conflicts and secession before Courts”.
13. While the right to decide itself has already been conceived in several ways, one of the 
most authoritative studies defines it as a constitutional right: see Barceló, cit., “el derecho a 
decidir… puede formularse en sede académica como un verdadero derecho constitucional, 
si se define como un derecho individual al ejercicio colectivo de los miembros de una comu-
nidad territorialmente localizada y democráticamente organizada que permite expresar y 
organizar mediante un procedimiento democrático la voluntad de redefinir el estatus político 
y marco institucional fundamental de dicha comunidad, incluida la posibilidad de construir 
un estado independiente”.
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adhere to a pluralistic and dynamic conception of constituent power and 
to consider it relevant and applicable to the Catalan experience.14 Indeed, 
the paper will explore whether the quarrel over the constitutional future 
of Catalonia might instead concern the potential reconceptualization of 
constituent power today. The notion of constituent power will be put into 
the perspective of the regional State’s historical evolution in Spain drawing 
on principles of pluralism and democracy to problematize the unitary and 
monistic nature of constituent power. 
To this end, we will proceed as follows. After a short theoretical look at 
contemporary theories regarding constituent power and sovereignty (2), 
we will consider the way in which this theoretical debate is relevant to the 
Spanish case through the analysis of some “turning points in the evolution of 
regionalism in Spain” (3). Finally, we will dissect the concept and regulation 
of independence referendums, wrestling at once with the unilateral referen-
dum held in Catalonia on October 1ST and the debate over the institutional 
relations between Catalonia and Spain in Catalonia (4 to 7).
2. Supra- and subnational challenges to the unitary 
nature of constituent power
The traditional unitary and monistic nature of the concept of constituent 
power is currently a subject of dispute both at the international and subna-
tional level. As for the first, thanks to contributions to the so-called global 
constitutionalism and the increasingly-complex nature of the exercise of 
public authority in the context of globalization, growing legal literature 
illustrates that the source of constituent power can no longer be accepted 
as a given fact. As for the second, the enduring debate over the contested 
nature of constituent power in federal States seems to have gained relevance 
and momentum in the context of plurinational States such as Scotland and 
Canada. In the following paragraphs both questions will be examined in 
turn. 
14. For exceedingly original and deep insight, see Bossacoma, Justícia i legalitat de la secessió, 
40 ff. 
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2.1. The international dimension: constituent power and 
interdependent State relationships
Notwithstanding this paper’s focus on the sub-national level, it may be ap-
propriate to highlight current debates on the possibility of referring con-
stituent power to the transnational arena. Indeed, this entails relativizing 
the unitary essence of constituent power and its coessential nexus with the 
State.15 According to Kumm — one of this recent trend’s most vocal observ-
ers — the self-standing legitimacy of national constitutions is under attack; 
State legitimacy, Kumm asserts, cannot stand on its own. Circumstances 
exist under which internal policies may affect external interests unjustly. 
Those national policies may therefore be qualified as lacking legitimacy. 
In such conditions, internal policies produce what Kumm defines as “jus-
tice-sensitive externalities”, meaning that in certain cases public policies 
may reverberate outside State A despite taking place inside its borders, and 
this in a way that unbearably offends the interests of State B: “national 
sovereigns can claim no legitimate authority to address questions involving 
justice-sensitive externalities unilaterally”. The leap from this reformulation 
constituent power is a straightforward one: “a constitution established by 
We the People can only claim legitimate authority over a domain in which 
there are no justice-sensitive externalities”. In other words, in the context of 
interdependent State-relationships, where public policies have direct impli-
cations in external domains, the authority of constituent power is relativized 
or even constrained to the extent that it does not unjustly affect exter-
nal instances. This vision regards obligations imposed by the international 
community as “global constitutive power” that “compete[s]” (Krisch) with 
national constituent power in shaping the boundaries of the State’s author-
ity.16 From a different perspective, Nico Krisch recently framed the issue 
of the multiplication of constituent power, reaching a different conclusion 
nevertheless. Krisch argues that “structural constraints of the transnational 
realm” lead us either to conclude that constituent power is absent from such 
spaces or to accept a more nuanced account of constituent power, qualifying 
it as merely “irritant”. This means there are societal forces at play, which, 
15. See Kumm, “Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law”. 
16. Ibidem, 708: “the legitimacy of the state in a world of sovereign states depends on its inte-
gration into an appropriately structured legal system which must be conceived as constituted 
by the international community as a global pouvoir constituant”. 
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though able to influence the role of global governance and international 
institutions, still fail to slot into the definition of constituent.17
Also, the unitary essence of constituent power has been critically considered 
by scholars grappling with the evolution of EU law from a constitutional 
standpoint. Take for instance the position of Peter Häberle. Some years ago, 
Häberle described national constitutions as “partials”, in that they require 
conceptual integration within the EU Constitutional system and none can 
claim to have the “last word”. In recent times the debate over constituent 
power in the EU has been revitalized.18 The EU crisis, to the extent that it has 
brought about a new phase of supranational constraints on national policies, 
may have played a crucial role in triggering this doctrinal debate. A mean-
ingful contribution to problematizing the magnitude of national constituent 
power has been made by Habermas, who offers an interesting account of 
what he defines as “mixed constituent power”, composed by citizens that act 
as both state citizens and EU citizens.19 
Such examples may appear to divert attention from the focus of this work 
— the subnational domain, rather than supra- or international challenges, 
to constituent power. In fact they do not, as they actually demonstrate the 
fragility of a monistic view of constituent power from the perspective of 
growing integration between the national and the EU or international level. 
Global and EU constitutionalism also helps to illustrate the coexistence of 
different constituent powers, as a reflection of the overlapping nature of 
constitutional subjects (citizens acting as state or as EU or world citizens). 
Furthermore, the above-referenced literature helps challenge a positivist ac-
count of constituent power and sovereignty and move towards an updated 
reading of those concepts. 
17. Krisch, “Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational order”: “yet this 
does not mean that constituent power does not have any purchase at all in this order, only 
that it will largely operate as a challenge to institutional action, as an irritant”.
18. Häberle, Costituzione e identità culturale, 62. 
19. See Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union. See also the special issue of the Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 2017. 
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2.2. The subnational dimension: constituent power 
between the right of resistance and revolutionary 
processes
If we now consider how constituent power is allocated at the internal level 
we can likely find further clues as to the unitary nature of constituent power 
and indications that sovereignty can no longer be taken for granted. To better 
clarify this point, we propose differentiating the analysis according to the 
intensity which subnational claims may acquire. Thus, we will separately cov-
er those sub-state claims directed at internally modifying the constitutional 
settlement of rights and powers between centre and periphery from those 
aimed at creating a new constitutional order by virtue of secession. 
The constitutive nature of decentralized and particularly federal countries 
has been contested since the very beginning of federalism in the US, Germa-
ny and Switzerland and essentially concerns the question of dual, shared or 
divided sovereignty. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton affirmed that States 
would retain their rights of sovereignty for those acts not delegated to the 
federation.20 Later on, Calhoun defended the idea that the political organ-
ization of the US was a confederation by arguing that sovereignty was not 
conceivable as divided or shared and it still belonged to the States. During 
the 19TH century the German literature addressed this problem as well: some 
authors (Waitz)21 insisted on the ability of sovereignty to be interpreted as 
limited or divided, according to the sphere of competence of the entity in 
20. Federalist Papers, no. 32, Alexander Hamilton: “An entire consolidation of the States 
into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; 
and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general 
will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State 
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they had before, and 
which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive 
delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: 
where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where 
it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States 
from exercising the same authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which 
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and 
REPUGNANT” (emph. in the original text).
21. Waitz, Grundzüge der Politik. See on the thought of the Georg Waitz recently Di Martino. 
“Il federalismo tedesco e Georg Waitz”. 
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question, whereas others (Seydel) rejected this theory.22 In particular, one 
of the most solid and well-known objections is the one formulated by Jell-
inek23 and based upon the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign 
States: whilst the former can self-determine their activity, the latter’s right 
to self-determine their activity depends on their sphere of competence. In 
this sense, the sovereign State is entitled to withdraw competences from 
the non-sovereign State, whereas the non-sovereign State cannot operate 
beyond its assigned competences.24     
Olivier Beaud re-opened this debate not long ago, first in his Théorie de la 
Fédération and subsequently in more recent works. His doctrine is anchored 
by an emphasis on the peculiar nature of federal constitutions, characterized 
as they are by conceptualisation as a “compact” law and not, as in unitary 
States, a supreme one. He then advocates a reworking of the types of State, 
offering a peculiar vision of the differences between States, Federations and 
Confederations. According to Beaud, Federations refuse a hierarchical re-
lationship between the central State and its periphery, as Federations are 
structured on an equal relationship between their component parts.25 As a 
consequence, the traditional difference between Federations and Confeder-
ations disappears. As for the subjects of the Federation, Beaud argues that a 
distinction must be drawn between federalism by segregation and federal-
ism by aggregation. Indeed, the prevailing literature effectively rests on the 
existence of a unitary constituent power in both cases. However, according 
to professor Beaud, different entities agree to shape a federation based on 
the plurality of constituent subjects expressing the will to be part of a wider 
federal entity. The question of who is the constituent power in such a system 
must be resolved insofar as “in a federative compact, the holders of the con-
stituent powers are the federating states” and “it remains a fact that when a 
Federation is created, there is not, historically speaking, a single people, the 
federative people … but a sum of peoples, those of the federating states, that 
decide to unite to form a new political unity”.26
22. For a synthesis, see Garcia Pelayo, Derecho constitucional comparado, 220 ff. and more 
recently Grimm, “La souveraineté”, 547-606.  
23. Jellinek, Teoría general del Estado, 377 ff. 
24. Ibidem, 372. 
25. For a recent analysis of Beaud’s theory, see Ferraiuolo, Costituzione, Federalismo, Secessione. 
26. Beaud, “The founding Constitution. Reflection on the Constitution of a federation and 
its peculiarity”, affirming: “In other words, the federative people is a compound people. Thus, 
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Beaud’s is an interesting perspective that fits within the purpose of this 
paper. His position however leaves open the opposite question: in the case 
of federalism, can plurality as regards constitutional subjects be conceived 
by dissociation as well? The question may indeed arise in the course of a 
federation’s evolution, or even in the case of a decentralized country, a cir-
cumstance which would be especially relevant for the Spanish case. Stephen 
Tierney has recently tried to answer this question with a set of arguments 
that bring us closer to the very essence of the relevance of constituent powers 
in the context of independence processes. Tierney has persuasively problem-
atized the uncontroversial unity of sovereignty and constituent power in 
multinational experiences.27 The author illustrates the possible coexistence 
between the preservation of the constitutional form and the entitlement of 
sub-state entities to be part of the constituent power. This last aspect, far 
from undermining the constitutional contract, helps underpin the legitimacy 
of the constitution when majority forces undermine the pluralist nature of 
the constitution. This is a seemingly paradoxical effect, as Tierney himself 
recognizes.28 And in this regard a parallel with the right of resistance might 
be drawn: subnational forces, in Tierney’s perspective, “resist” the undemo-
cratic development of the constitution and help re-establish the constitutional 
order. However, this might be at odds with the traditional vision of consti-
tutionalism, according to which constituent power creates new powers and 
constitutions rather than limiting (or in the sense of Tierney, “revising”) old 
ones. But taking into account Beaud’ s previously-stated position, it may be 
said that if in the Federation rules are constituted by the sub-state entities 
that compose it and no hierarchy exists amongst them, then those sub-state 
entities should be entitled to resist every deviation from the shared system 
of rules. 
More generally, Tierney’s position is the closest attempt at pinning down the 
problem in the context of independence processes. However, he deliberately 
considers non-secession nationalism in order to demonstrate the existence of 
a sub-state constituent power dedicated to revising possible violations of sub-
states’ rights. In so doing he gets at a longstanding issue of constitutionalism: 
even in a Federal Republic, we must talk of a plurality of subjects of the constituent power 
if we wish to describe the political holders of that power properly”, 52. 
27. See Tierney, “We the peoples”.
28. Ibidem, 239 ff. 
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the difference between the right of resistance and revolutionary processes. It 
may be interesting to ask whether sub-state non-secession instances, on the 
one hand, and independence claims, on the other, can symmetrically reflect 
those concepts. In substance, it could be argued that where sub-state non-se-
cession interests claim a right to resistance inasmuch as they endeavour to 
preserve the existing constitutional order, secessionist claims are conceptu-
ally aimed at going beyond the legal bounds of the State/Federation scheme, 
determining to create a new constitutional framework. In this second case, 
when the efforts of sub-national forces fail to prevail upon their counter-
parts’, a new understanding of the sub-state future may take hold, in which 
case a gradual process from resistance to revolution may then arise. This 
second scenario involves the formation or consolidation of a new constituent 
power — here conceived in its strictest sense — whose ultimate aim is no 
longer to limit the existing constituent power but to determine a new one. 
In this case a new question emerges. Whereas what is at stake in non-se-
cession scenarios is the limitation of power —federal or central—, in seces-
sionist quarrels, the ultimate question of the legitimacy of power remains 
unresolved. In this case people or the constituent power are tasked with 
resolving the question of what fundament of the constituted power exists. 
The shift from the former to the latter may amount to a series of gradual 
acts directly or indirectly contradicting the legal order, the most conse-
quential of these being a unilateral referendum on independence from the 
State. Here, legitimacy-related claims challenge the relevance of legality by 
virtue of practices, claims and discourses that might walk a tightrope along 
the constitutional order or transcend its limits outright. It is clear that in 
such a situation formalistic approaches will not contribute in the long run 
to defusing the crisis. Rather, cooperative effort between law and politics 
is required. Interestingly, Tierney and other authors have also often drawn 
parallels between legal methodology and subnational claims of potentially 
great relevance as a means of untangling the constitutional crisis. In sub-
stance, sub-state nationalism presents a twofold challenge to constitutional 
law, for it not only encourages a re-negotiation of constitutional content but 
also challenges a formalistic reading of the constitution, often proposing “a 
historically or sociologically contextualized account”.29 
29. Tierney, above, 237.
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3. The Spanish case: Article 2 in the constituent 
process and its interpretation 
The purpose of this section is to verify whether the assumptions of the 
above-referenced literature are useful to better understanding the ongoing 
standoff between the Catalan and the central government. We seek to answer 
the question of whether doctrines that problematize the unitary notion of 
constituent power — such as those advanced by Tierney and Beaud — might 
be relevant to recognizing that some portion and fragments of constituent 
power are perhaps detectable at the subnational level, too. In other terms, our 
task is not only to question whether it is admissible to challenge the unitary 
conception of constituent power and sovereignty in Spain, but also to argue 
that denying the process of fragmentation of both concepts is at once coun-
terproductive and anachronistic. This cannot be answered in abstract terms. 
Rather, we must consider the role of Autonomous Communities (hereinafter 
ACs) and particularly of Catalonia over the course of the transition and 
consolidation of the State in Spain. In order to better frame current debates 
on the alleged existence of a right to decide we must first go back to the con-
stituent moment in which an agreement on the final wording of Article 2 — 
and the form of the State — was ultimately reached. It is suggested, indeed, 
that that constituent moment is crucial to current Catalan claims because it 
crystallized the adoption of a specific concept of sovereignty, rejecting other 
interpretations thereof. 
The 1978 Constitution — like many other constitutional transitions — in-
volves a series of compromises between countervailing forces, the most chal-
lenging of which is likely the territorial structure of the State and particularly 
the drafting of Article 2.30 It is widely recognized that the agreement reached 
by the constituent courts on this provision — and on the VIII Title more 
generally — marked a turning point in the constituent process, representing 
the mediation between opposing conceptions of the structure and finality 
of the State. As Solé Tura clearly puts it, this provision allowed “combining 
in the same definition, the concept of Spanish unitary notion and those of 
nationality and region, as its essential components”.31 The importance of the 
30. So Alzaga Villaamil, “Articulo 2”, 77. 
31. Solé Tura, “Nazionalità e nazionalismo in Spagna. Autonomie, federalismo e autodeter-
minazione”, 74, recognizing later on that Article 2 “richiama seppur in forma disordinata 
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compromise is difficult to overstate, but the argument could be made that 
Article 2 concluded the issue of the allocation of sovereignty on paper alone, 
striking what was only a temporary balance as to the territorial and identity 
issue. That balance has however come under continuous assault ever since, 
hence this paper’s concern about the question of whether the right to decide 
might be challenged, given that the Catalan claims are closely entwined with 
the structure and interpretation of the territorial compact reached at the 
origins of the Spanish democracy. Indeed, regional forces —Catalonia in 
particular— contributed both to the framing of the constitution and to its 
development.32 
Article 2 of the Constitution received much attention during the early years 
of the Spanish democracy and was the object of analysis by legal33 and po-
litical science scholars.34 Prevailing scholarship reads it as a provision that 
ultimately places the locus of sovereignty and constituent power in the Span-
ish people. This is particularly clear in the words of one constituent assembly 
member, Peces Barba, who stated “we absolutely did not want the constitution 
to provide quarter to original (and not exclusively organizational) federalism 
that consisted in advocating the sovereignty of nations based on a skewed 
application of the ‘romantic principle’ whereby every nation possesses the 
right to independent statehood and is ignorant as regards the historical real-
ities of Spain”.35 A close reading of this statement has been used repeatedly to 
advocate for the evolution of the Estado Autonómico. More recently, Solozabal 
has confirmed this prevailing interpretation of Article 2 by stating that “en 
due diverse idee della Spagna, storicamente contrapposte non solo sul piano ideologico, ma 
anche su quello politico militare: da una parte la concezione della Spagna come nazione 
unica ed indivisibile e, dall’altra, come un insieme articolato di popoli diversi di nazionalità 
storicamente formate e di regioni”. 
32. See González Casanova, “Cataluña en la gestación constituyente del Estado de las Co-
munidades Autónomas”.
33. See Solé Tura, “Nazione e nazionalismo in Spagna”, for an in-depth account of the draft-
ing of article 2; Alzaga Villaamil, “Articulo 2”; Bastida, La nación española y el nacionalismo 
constitucional. For a recent account, see Dominguez, Más allá de la nación.  
34. See, for example, the works of Ferran Requejo. 
35. “no queríamos en ningún caso que se pudiese apoyar en la constitución, un federalismo 
originario y no solo organizativo consistente en defender una soberanía propia a las nacion-
alidades basada en una torcida aplicación del principio romántico de que cada nación tiene 
derecho a ser un estado independiente y en un desconocimiento de la realidad histórica de 
España”.
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nuestro ordenamiento soberano es el pueblo español en su conjunto, y nin-
guna fracción” and that “el titular de la soberanía es un sujeto homogéneo, 
no un sujeto múltiple” (p. 53). As a matter of fact, this is anything but the 
literal interpretation of Article 2. The need to reaffirm what already clearly 
stands from the Constitution of course has ancient roots, and dates back to 
the constituent debates, as we will see shortly. This position has immediate 
consequences where the Estatutos de Autonomía are concerned, as it holds that 
their legitimacy relies uniquely on the Constitution (“la procedencia última 
del Estatuto del poder constituyente español”). The TC, as it is known, has 
endorsed this interpretation, advocating the unitary conception of the con-
stituent power, as seen in the previous section, as well as the fact that the 
Estatutos derive their legitimacy from the Constitution. 
However persuasive and solid this conception might be, it is generally held 
that different assumptions of sovereignty and constituent power permeat-
ed the constituent debates. Current debates on the alleged constitutional 
foundation of the right to decide and unitary conception of constituent 
power must acknowledge the fact that during the framing of Article 2 “the 
real battlefield was the concept of sovereignty”, as astutely pointed out by 
Gonzalez Casanova.36 The question is not only whether they are still defend-
able; the question seems rather to be, on the one hand, how they fit within 
Tierney and Beaud’s assumptions, and, on the other hand, whether they help 
to clarify the terms of the debate on the right to decide. 
To consider the constituent process of the 1978 Constitution, indeed, is to 
detect the different conceptions of nations, people, constituent power and 
sovereignty that are present. Parliamentary reports indicate that several po-
litical forces challenged the draft of article 1.2 and article 2 CE. Simply put, 
many parliamentary groups, in varying degrees of intensity, defended the 
idea that the future State would be composed of several nations or peoples, 
each preserving its sphere of sovereignty, i.e. each maintaining its fraction 
of constituent power. At least three different conceptions of sovereignty can 
be identified apart from the final version. 
First, at one end of the spectrum, this conception was strictly conceived 
as the right to self-determination. Consider, for example, the amendment 
36. González Casanova, “El articulo 2 y el debatido caso de las nacionalidades”. 
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submitted by Basque deputy Letamendia,37 which proposed a series of pro-
visions (articles 149 bis and ter)38 to recognize and proceduralie the right to 
self-determination within the Constitution. Though the amendment was 
ultimately rejected by the other political forces, the proposal had rested 
on a multiple conception of sovereignty according to which traditional na-
tions under the new Constitution would have maintained a quota to their 
sovereignty. In another amendment the same deputy proposed a different 
wording of current article 1.2 which affirmed “The prerogatives of the pow-
ers of the State emanate from the peoples that compose the State, in which 
the sovereignty is vested”.39  
Yet, the idea that the new Constitution was given structure and substance 
by different peoples integrating the new State was not espoused by inde-
pendence proponents alone. It was also not necessarily linked to the need to 
constitutionalize the right to self-determination. A second version, defended 
by progressive forces such as the PSUC, favoured a federal entity. In a slightly 
different vein, Miquel Roca, from the group Minoria Catalana, expressly 
referred to the plurinational reality of the Spanish nation, whereas Heribert 
Barrera, representing Esquerra Catalana, affirmed that “The draft proposal 
ignores the true nature of the Spanish State and insists on the serious mistake 
of not giving back the essential part of sovereignty to each one of the nations 
that compose it”.40 Thus, according to that position, the only way to resolve 
the identity conflict was to conceive of the new State as one formed through 
“partial and express cession of sovereignty to the nations that compose it”.41 
To charge that such initiatives aimed to create a confederation of States rath-
er than a federal or unitary State is perhaps tempting. However, even as some 
deputies defended that purpose, the prevailing spirit in constituent courts 
seemed to favour an abandoning of the State’s previous centralist structure, 
whether federal or confederal. Could this be read as a confirmation of the 
37. Diario de sesiones, 16 de junio de 1978, no. 91, p. 1693. 
38. Ibidem. 
39. “Los poderes de todos los órganos del Estado emanan de los pueblos que lo componen, 
en los que reside la soberanía”. 
40. Ibidem. “El anteproyecto ignora la verdadera naturaleza del Estado español y persiste 
en el grave error de no restituir lo esencial de su soberanía a cada una de las naciones que lo 
integran”.
41. H. Barrera i Costa, Diario de Sesiones, 8 May 1978, p. 2071 and 2081 respectively. “Cesiones 
parciales y expresas de soberanía por parte de cada una de las naciones que la integran”.
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need to problematize the differences between federation and confederation 
as assumed by Beaud?
In this context, it is also worth remembering the socialist parliamentary 
group’s various endorsements of the contested idea of Spain as a nation of 
nations42  — even if this expression has been contested by many authors of 
contrasting centralist, federalist and even secessionist perspectives.43 
Further, the monolithic character of the sovereignty of the Spanish people 
was also challenged by socialist representatives. Distancing themselves from 
the existence of original sovereignty within the new State, these voices never-
theless maintained that the nationalities would share exclusive sovereignty by 
means of their political (i.e. not administrative) powers.44 Under those terms, 
which differed from the Basque vision, the ACs would not exercise a quota of 
their sovereignty but would be entrusted with a quota of the State sovereignty, 
i.e. they would be co-holders of the State sovereignty. The advantage of this 
position would be to avoid a strict identification between the State and the 
central government. In short, this view meant that when the sub-state entities 
did exercise their authority within a given territory they would have done so 
in their capacity as co-holder of State sovereignty.45 
Simply put, one common feature among those political forces might have 
been the awareness that the unity of Spain stemmed from the Constitution 
itself, which therefore recognized (not created) the pre-existing nature of the 
historical regions. According to that view, this right to autonomy was indeed 
at least in part based on pre-existing tradition and experiences. As Casanova 
interestingly puts it, article 2 should have been worded the other way round. 
Rather than casting the Constitution as grounded upon the indissoluble unity 
42. Peces Barba: “la existencia de España como nación no excluye la existencia de naciones 
en el interior de España, naciones-comunidades, pero la existencia de estas naciones-co-
munidades no debe llevarnos a una aplicación rígida del principio de las nacionalidades tal 
como se formuló por los liberales en el siglo XIX, de que cada nación debe ser un Estado 
independiente”. 
43. See, for instance, F. Requejo, “¿Nación de naciones?”, El País, 19.03.1996. 
44. This is particularly evident in the words of Martin Toval, quoted in Casanova, “El artícu-
lo 2”, 1677, who affirmed that: “No hay problema de soberanía con la palabra nacionalidades 
porque esas nacionalidades constituidas en comunidades autónomas son participes de la 
soberanía de España”.  
45. González Casanova, “El artículo 2”. 
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of the Spanish Nation, the article would have done better to contend that the 
Constitution frames and guarantees the unity of Spain.46  
Be that as it may, constituent courts, rejecting the idea that different subjects 
were part of the constituent power, drew a rigid distinction between the 
concept of sovereignty and that of self-government, dismissing the claim 
that “national sovereignty of the State is distributed among the Autonomous 
Communities”.47 Even so, among the range of conceptions of sovereignty 
that emerged during the constituent process, it might be interesting to ask 
whether a different outcome would have been better aligned with the re-
ality of ACs in Spain. To this end we will elaborate on the nexus between 
co-sovereignty and democracy. In particular we are interested in the question 
of whether traces of those alleged original or co-constituent sovereignties 
remained somehow quiescent or latent and continued to influence and shape 
the evolution of the Spanish structure of the State.48 Or, put another way, 
whether constituted powers nullified or prevented the existence of that laten-
cy despite the democratic principle, according to which no democratic State 
can without denying that principle show indifference towards the aspiration 
of part of its territory to exercise or recuperate its latent sovereignty. This 
will be achieved through the selection and analysis of certain “constitutional 
moments”, such as the initial proposals and reform of the EAC in 2006. In so 
doing we will ultimately seek to demonstrate how the issue of the original 
sovereignties or co-sovereignties during the constituent process re-emerged 
repeatedly over the development of the Estado Autonómico.
4. The evolution of the Estado Autonómico and the 
sovereignty/decentralization nexus
In this section, we will see how the issue of the original sovereignties during 
the constituent process re-emerged repeatedly over the evolution of the Estado 
Autonómico. Not an easy task, particularly since the relationship between sov-
46. Casanova, Cataluña. Federación o independencia, 42. 
47. Ibidem, “La soberanía nacional del Estado se distribuye entre las Comunidades Autóno-
mas”.
48. As for the Catalonia case, see Viver and Grau, “The Catalan Parliament’s contribution 
to the consolidation and development of self-government and the defence of Catalonia’s 
national identity”, 10.
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ereignty and decentralization remains a relatively under-researched subject 
in Spanish legal scholarship. Indeed, though some authors are regarded as 
crucial to interpreting the role of sovereignty in the Spanish Constitution 
(Muñoz Machado, Gonzalez Casanova), the debate seems rarely to have fo-
cused on this issue and literature on the concept of nation clearly domi-
nates. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to assume an uncontested notion 
of sovereignty in the Spanish State from reading Article 1.2 and 2, given 
that both relate to the constituent process and the asymmetry of Spanish 
decentralization. A systematic approach to that question can be found in the 
above quoted works of Ruiperez who, on many occasions, provided a broad 
account of shared sovereignty in federal States and dismissed the concept as 
inapplicable in both Federal States and Spain.49 This is the prevailing inter-
pretation and it has been taken up by many authors, Solozabal included.50 
Some attempts, albeit scarce, have been made to illustrate a contrary opinion. 
This is particularly the case of the (contested) works of Herrero y Rodríguez 
de Miñón. These argue for the existence of co-sovereignty, a theory based 
on the First Additional Provision, but were intended by the author to refer 
to the Catalan case as well. This has been seconded by other Basque authors, 
Canyo among them, who explicitly recognize that “The intended freedom 
of the constituent power in the Basque and Catalan case was predetermined 
by the power of the historical process”.51 
Arguably, the relevance of this issue is best appreciated in the debates on the 
nature and role of Estatutos, the quintessence of the Spanish structure of the 
State. On the one hand, solid arguments have been presented to dispel any 
doubt as to the non-constitutional nature of the Estatutos. This is clarified 
in the rigid distinction between poder constituyente and poder estatuyente.52 
Muñoz Machado clearly framed the question of whether the Estatutos could 
be construed as expressions of a constituent power. The response—“no”—held 
that they can only be interpreted as legal norms derived from and subordi-
49. See the essays collected in Ruipérez, Proceso Constituyente, Soberanía y Autodeterminación.
50. Solozábal, Nación y constitución.
51. “La pretendida libertad del poder constituyente en el caso vasco y catalán, estaba prede-
terminada por la del proceso histórico”. This author recognized that “estas interpretaciones 
que ni son mayoritarias ni están respaldadas por la jurisprudencia constitucional en cambio 
son constitucionalmente posibles aunque resulten políticamente incomodas. Es un problema 
en todo caso de interpretación”.
52. Solozábal, Nación y constitución.
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nated to the Constitution.53 However, Machado himself acknowledges that 
a greater complexity exists, for those norms complement and limit constit-
uent power. Most interestingly, the author elaborates on the (ir)reversible 
nature of self-government and considers that, while revoking powers of the 
ACs is perhaps possible in principle, it remains unfeasible politically.54 Thus, 
constituent power is factually constrained by subnational powers. This in-
terpretation seems to have much in common with theories of fundamental 
rights aimed at showing the irreversible nature of rights’ recognition. There 
exists a growing body of literature,55 particularly in the German context, con-
tending that once social rights are recognized by the legislature subsequent 
limiting or abiding of those rights could be the source of serious constitu-
tional concerns, and some authors argue that the German Fundamental Law 
implicitly provides for a prohibition to repeal (Rückstrittsverbot) social rights 
when they have been recognized by the Parliament. One wonders wheth-
er such a Rücktrittsverbot is relevant to the discourse on decentralization, a 
demonstration of the fact that the sovereignty of constituent power, though 
conceivable from a purely legal point of view, may present both practical and 
constitutional hurdles. 
The foregoing is challenged by a small segment of the Spanish scholarship. 
Herrero y Rodriguez de Miñon in particular addressed this question most 
frequently. Drawing on his previous studies on the historical rights and 
the interpretation of the First Additional Provision in some recent studies, 
Herrero de Miñon explicitly affirmed the existence of co-sovereignties or 
shared sovereignty in Spanish democracy. He relies on the studies of con-
stitutional pluralism, such as those conducted by Häberle or Zagrebelsky, 
to underpin the position according to which the Constitution requires a 
constant renewal of its content. In particular, if sovereignty can be defined 
as the Komptenz-Kompetenz, it might be said that “co-sovereignty is anything 
53. Muñoz, 3666, “Siendo este el régimen constitucional, el poder estatuyente solo puede ser 
considerado como un poder derivado, limitado y sometido a la Constitución”. 
54. “Bien es cierto que como el poder soberano es irresistible, siempre podría recuperar esta 
fragmentación y reintegrarla a la plena unidad e indivisibilidad. Sin embargo, aunque pudiera 
hacerlo en Buena teoría, resulta difícil que lo haga, ya que la desarticulación del sistema de 
autonomías, mediante decisión constituyentes revocatorias de lo establecido en los Estatutos 
supone una convulsión política y jurídica de enorme envergadura”. 
55. Sarlet, “Proibição de Retrocesso, Dignidade da Pessoa Humana e Direitos Sociais: mani-
festação de um constitucionalismo dirigente possível”.
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that the co-decision on its own competence (?)”.56 The author ultimately 
concludes that the different national subjects of the constituent agreement 
contribute to the constitution’s transformation into a living instrument.57 
The issue of sovereignty has emerged frequently and the declaration of Bar-
celona is perhaps one of the most famous instances. However it is in the 
context of the last wave of reforms of the Estatutos that the issue of sov-
ereignty arguably played the most significant role. It is broadly accepted 
that constitutive elements of self-government were an element common 
to several Estatutos. Andalucía included many references to the history and 
identity of its community. In this context of reforms, the new Estatut de 
Catalunya clearly stood out. The preamble and the first provisions of the new 
text notably reinforced the relevance of identity and history, strengthening 
the so-called “quasi-constitutional” nature of this source of law. 
In particular, the emphasis on the issue of identity in the last wave of re-
forms could be construed as symbolic of the effort to highlight the pre-con-
stitutional origins of autonomy. The Estatutos could, in such a context, be 
regarded as the expression of a fragment of those original sovereignties 
denied during the “constituent instant” that lead to the final draft of Article 
2 and re-emerged over the evolution of the Estado Autónomico. One could 
make the argument that the aspiration for the recognition of that portion 
of sovereignty once denied and still latent can be appreciated in the pream-
ble and Article 5 of the Estatut. Those provisions are aimed at affording the 
Estatut an added measure of legitimacy, linking it to its pre-constitutional 
epoch. This also reflects the existence of a constitutional life of the ACs 
that proceeds in parallel to the State constitutional life. The Estatutos are the 
clearest example of this sub-state constitutional life.58
Sovereignty discourse played a substantial role in the context of proposals 
to reform the Statute, well before negotiations to reform it began. Consid-
er for example the seminar Autonomia i sobirania, where representatives of 
56. Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, “Soberanía y derechos históricos”.
57. Herrero, op. cit., 2548, arguing for the necessity that the constitutional agreement has 
to be constantly renovated by the national forces underpinning it. 
58. For a severe critique of the “Nou Estatut” see Caja, “Estatuto de Cataluña y soberanía 
española”, El Noticiero de las Ideas, 2006, arguing that it implies a threat to the sovereignty 
of the Spanish people.
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Catalan parties expressed their views on “shared sovereignty” (“sobirania 
compartida”),59 a concept used to promote a new Federal State as an alterna-
tive to independence. Later, in the context of the reform of the new Estatut, 
political parties engaged again with sovereignty both in the Parlament and, 
subsequently, the Cortes. One example is the draft presented by Esquerra Re-
publicana, which recognised in article 1 that “ la sobirania radica en el poble 
català i es manifesta a traves de la voluntat que emana de les urnes”. Although 
this provision was not adopted, many deputies and senators argued that other 
provisions of the final text, particularly the preamble, the references to the 
nation and article 5, posed threats to Spanish sovereignty and were thus in 
breach of the Spanish Constitution.60 
The Constitutional Court took part in this debate, setting forth its under-
standing of sovereignty under the Spanish Constitution in at least three 
landmark judgements: first in the STC 103/2008 when it struck down the 
law of the Basque Parliament calling for a popular consultation in the Basque 
country (see footnote 11); second in the STC 31/2010 when it declared uncon-
stitutional and devoid of legal effect a number of provisions of the Estatut; 
third in the STC 42/2014, when it declared the resolution on the sovereignty 
of the Catalan Parliament unconstitutional. In the STC 31/2010 the TC took 
the view that the provisions of the Estatut threatened the unitary notion of 
the constituent power and its sovereignty. For the purpose of this paper it 
is useful to look briefly at how the TC considered Article 2.4 of the Estatut. 
The plaintiff claimed that the provision ran afoul of the national sover-
eignty enshrined in Article 1.2 of the Spanish Constitution. Yet, the Court 
took the opportunity to affirm that “El pueblo de Cataluña no es … sujeto 
jurídico que entre en competencia con el titular de la soberanía nacional 
cuyo ejercicio ha permitido la instauración de la Constitución de la que trae 
causa el Estatuto”. This statement has been dismissed as superfluous, for 
Article 2.4 did not in any way challenge national sovereignty. In the poste-
59. This is particularly clear in the words of Narcís Serra i Serra, from the PSC, who favours 
both shared sovereignty and federalism: “per tant estem en situació de sobirania compartida. 
L’estat-nació esta desplaçant la seva sobirania i l’està compartint. I cada cop la compartirà 
més amb els municipis”, p. 28. 
60. See, for instance, Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 5 de mayo de 2006. Viver affirmed: “Jo 
sempre he mantingut que el terme nació aplicat a Catalunya podia formar part de l’articulat 
de l’Estatut sense incórrer en inconstitucionalitat; el problema de la seva incorporació o no a 
l’articulat és més polític que no pas jurídic”. From the same author, see also Viver, “Soberanía, 
autonomía, interés general…”.
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rior ruling on the resolution of sovereignty (STC 42/2014), the TC declared 
it unconstitutional, holding that the Catalan people cannot be recognized 
as sovereign: indeed, this “no puede suponer la simultanea negación de la 
soberanía nacional que, conforme a la Constitución, reside únicamente en 
el conjunto del pueblo español”. Concerning the STC 31/2010, critics of the 
Court’s judgement and the Attorney of the Catalan Parliament argued that 
none of the provisions of the Estatut represented a defence of Cataluña as a 
sovereign nation. Perhaps convincing as a strategy to impede the Estatut’s 
declaration as unconstitutional, the claim does not fit with parliamenta-
ry discussions of the issue, nor does it appear to be the best conceptual 
theoretical reconstruction. Parliamentary reports — as previously noted 
— revealed the aim of the framers to be movement towards a new concep-
tion of sovereignty. The objective, not necessarily recognition of a right to 
self-determination among sub-state entities, was, rather, a questioning of the 
dogma of the unitary notion of the sovereignty accepted in 1978. In other 
words, both the Statute and the parliamentary resolution challenged the 
traditional conception of sovereignty according to which sub-state entities 
could be deemed sovereign in their sphere of competence; the TC — and the 
prevailing scholarship — refused to accept that position at their own peril, 
as demonstrated by the backlash those judgements produced.61 Yet, denial of 
this alternative vision of the centre-periphery relationship in contemporary 
constitutionalism seems counterproductive for the purposes of the alleged 
unitary nature of the unitary sovereignty. In the case of Spain, it may be 
asserted that the Court sought somehow to reproduce the intention of the 
constitution-makers in order to remove any doubt as to the plurinational 
conception of sovereignty.62 However, the evolution of the Estado Autonómico 
has already shown that such an interpretation is scarcely equipped to handle 
plurinational tensions within the regional State. 
It might be tempting to read historical and identity-based references in the 
last wave of reforms as a potential disruptive phenomenon liable to strength-
en nationalism and secessionist claims. However, as we saw in the previous 
section, sovereignty claims are not a unitary phenomenon. Moreover, they 
reflect either an effort to achieve recognition for a potential separation from 
61. See Ferraiuolo, Costituzione, federalismo, secessione.
62. See Albertí, “El Estado de las Autonomías después de la STC sobre el Estatuto de Cata-
luña”: “Con la STC 31/2010 que despliega aquí principalmente su carga preventiva se cierra 
el paso a esta posible concepción del Estado Autonómico”, 94.
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Spain or create a different form of the State, whether federal or confederal. 
This is to say that the attempt to recognize history as a further criterion of 
legitimacy of the Estatutos cannot be necessarily interpreted as a preliminary 
stage of separatism. It could also be seen differently, as the product of a more 
multifaceted elaborate phenomenon. First, this is a clear manifestation of the 
differentiated reality of the Spanish articulation of vertical powers, seem-
ingly inextricable from the Spanish system. In this sense, one may contend 
that regional differences and national claims are accommodated rather than 
suspiciously interpreted. Second, this trend shows the reaction or “resistance” 
to the way the regional State was developed and interpreted by the Con-
stitutional Court. Third, this trend might also be understandably seen as a 
manifestation of quiescent and “latent” sovereignties. While not necessarily 
imbricated with separatist claims, these can be coupled with the recognition 
of the ACs’ role as co-founders and interpreters of the Estado Autonómico, 
seemingly either strengthening nationalist claims or opening up the possi-
bility of the Spanish State’s advance towards a federal or confederal system.
5. Original sovereignties and the referendum. The 
need to reconsider Article 150.2 
Having grappled with the tension between single and multiple sovereignties in 
the origin and evolution of the Estado Autonómico, it remains to be seen whether 
and how this discourse is relevant for the Catalan 2017 referendum. When a 
widespread coalition appeals for the separation of a given territory from its 
larger institutional context, referendums, it is generally accepted, are the most 
appropriate legal instrument to address this conflictive situation. In Spain, 
with both parts failing, as they did, to reach an agreement on the territorial 
dispute, the celebration of a negotiated referendum seemed inescapable. Yet, as 
it is known, a unilateral referendum has taken place and the ways to handle 
the quarrel between Catalonia and Spain remain unclear. Consequently, the 
following considerations may appear outdated. However, it is also true that 
legal reasoning cannot be hijacked or impeded by the political situation. Some 
years ago, the Consell Assesssor per a la Transició Nacional proposed five ways 
to legally hold a referendum in Catalonia.63 I would like to focus on just one of 
them, the most reasonable, in my opinion, for both parts. According to Article 
63. “La Consulta sobre el futuro político de Catalunya”, 48 ff.  
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149.1.32, referendums fall within the competence of the national government, 
the only entities allowed to hold “consultas” being the ACs. In spite of this, 
the possibility that the central government delegate or transfer the “faculty” 
to hold a referendum in Catalonia as per Article 150.2 of the Spanish Constitu-
tion has for years been the subject of political and constitutional feuding.64 The 
interpretation of the Article gave rise to many debates among constitutional 
scholars: in particular, legal scholars have raised questions about the scope of 
the delegation, the interpretation of the expression “by their very nature”, the 
revocation of the delegated powers, and the interplay between Article 150.2 
and Article 149.1.1.65 
Constitutional scholars have already expressed their views on Article 150.2’s 
potential usefulness towards celebrating a referendum on the right to decide. 
Some have made the case that Article 150.2 cannot be invoked in order to hold 
a referendum in Catalonia. Without a list of “non-transferrable” subjects, the 
case had been made for reviewing whether the delegation of a given subject 
would represent a violation of constitutional principles. Then, if Article 150.2 
is invoked to allow a referendum on the “right to decide”, such a delegation 
of powers would infringe on Articles 2 and 1.2 of the Spanish constitution.66 
By contrast, a different interpretation has been submitted on the following 
grounds: “no hi veig base ni raons per a una interpretació restrictiva ni de 
les atribucions de les autoritats que compten amb el suport dels representants 
dels ciutadans, ni del dret de participació consultiva directa dels ciutadans.”67 
In addition, a third position holds that a referendum via Article 150.2 CE 
might possibly find an additional source of legitimacy in comparative law: in 
the case of the Scottish referendum, the Parliament of Westminster delegated 
to Scotland the possibility of holding the 2014 referendum. Despite Spain 
and the UK’s deeply different constitutional systems, as the doctrine itself 
64. See on this three different opinions: Viver, “Una reflexión desde Cataluña sobre el ‘Dere-
cho a decidir’”, Montilla Martos, “La vía del artículo 150.2 para la convocatoria del referéndum” 
and Arbós, “Els límits naturals i els artificials de l’article 150.2 CE”.  
65. See Rodrigues de Santiago, Velasco Caballero, “Límites a la transferencia o delegación 
del artículo 150.2 CE”, 97-132 and Bassols Coma, Serrano Alberca, “El artículo 149 de la Con-
stitución en relación con el artículo 150.2”. 
66. Montilla Martos, “La vía del Artículo 150.2”, arguing that “no resulta posible por su 
propia naturaleza al contradecir su objeto principios constitucionales como los de unidad o 
soberanía nacional”.
67. Arbós, “Els límits naturals i els artificials”. 
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recognises, the argument represents an additional means of problematizing 
the seemingly static assumption according to which Article 150.2 cannot be 
used to hold a referendum in Catalonia.68  
Be that as it may, the Spanish Parliament has voted several times against 
transferring the competence to call for a referendum on its independence 
from Spain to the Catalan Government, the last time being in 2012.69 Yet, 
most striking in the debate on Article 150.2 is the uncontested nature of the 
disparity between the ACs and the central power. Whereas the former are 
entitled to submit requests according to article 150.2, the latter are under no 
obligation to either consider them or even provide a reasonable (i.e. non-ar-
bitrary) response on the subject. This is because the wording of Article 150.2 
sets out that the power to transfer or delegate powers according to Article 
150.2 is an act of sovereignty. The wording of Article 150.2 is, for its part, 
quite concise, stating simply that the State “may transfer” — a sweeping 
allocation of discretionary power.70 However, things need not be like this 
per se. Such an imbalance of powers, between the regional parliament that 
requests the transfer (or exercise) of a competence and the bare discretionary 
nature of the decision of the Cortes, is at once anachronistic and seemingly 
at odds with the concrete evolution of the Estado Autonómico. In this regard 
the authoritative doctrine of García de Enterría may be instructive. Many 
years ago the renowned professor of administrative law wrote on the inter-
pretation of the possibility for the State to revoke delegated or transferred 
powers. He raised the question of whether “las transferencias o delegaciones 
que se realicen por medio de Leyes de ese tipo ¿son luego revocables ad nutum 
por las mismas Cortes Generales que las otorgaron?” Whereas the article did 
not cover the separate issue of the initial delegation or transfer of powers, 
68. Viver, “Una reflexión desde Cataluña sobre el ‘Derecho a decidir’”. 
69. See Proposición no de Ley sobre la transferencia a la Generalitat de Cataluña de las fac-
ultades de ejecución de la legislación del Estado para la autorización de la convocatoria de 
consultas populares por vía de referéndum. 276 deputies voted against the proposal and 42 
in favour of it.  For the previous proposals see https://citafalsa.com/2016/09/21/las-dieciocho-
veces-que-dicen-que-se-ha-solicitado-un-referendum-de-secesion-en-el-congreso/.
70. In this regard, see Montilla, “Article 150”, where he draws an interesting parallelism 
between the powers of the Government in Article 87.2 and those of the Cortes in Article 
150.2: “Una vez formulada queda sometida a la voluntad de los órganos estatales: los órganos 
postulan y los estatales, las Cortes Generales, deciden si transfieren o delegan determinadas 
facultades competenciales de titularidad estatal. Las Cortes Generales no están obligadas a 
tomar en consideración la propuesta autonómica” (emph. added), p. 2056. 
67 REAF núm. 27, juny 2018, p. 41-79
Constituent power and independence processes
the conclusion of the author might be relevant for our purposes. Interest-
ingly, he concluded his analysis by stating that “me permito afirmar que 
una revocación ad nutum de una transferencia o delegación, sin una causa 
objetiva identificable, sin razonabilidad acreditada, sería un supuesto claro 
de arbitrariedad”.71 According to that view, the revocation of the transferred 
powers cannot be the expression of an arbitrary and unchallengeable act but 
it has to be based on reasoned arguments. Thus, one wonders whether such 
an interpretation should be deemed relevant also for the case of the first 
delegation. In other terms, we argue that the refusal of the Cortes to delegate 
a specific function must be reasonably motivated and cannot be based on 
an arbitrary assumption. This is above all a consequence of the rule of law, 
which requires State powers to perform their tasks avoiding arbitrary or 
capricious acts or behaviours.72 The Congress may certainly reject a request 
from regional parliaments. However, to constrain this regional prerogative, 
the rule of law or the “imperio de la ley”73 declared in the preamble of the 
Spanish Constitution requires that the Cortes  substantiate that decision and 
base it upon legal arguments. Such an interpretation is further confirmed if 
we regard the principle of self-government as enshrined in Article 2 and of 
the “principio dispositivo”. Otherwise, one might equally ask whether the 
relevant ACs should be entrusted with the power to challenge the Constitu-
tional Court by virtue of a conflict of competence. Now, for what concerns 
the debate on Article 150.2 in the context of the potential referendum in 
Catalonia, the Catalan Parliament adopted several resolutions asking the 
Cortes to empower it with the faculty to hold a referendum. However, those 
resolutions, too, have been rejected by the national parliament, albeit with 
71. García de Enterría, “Las Leyes del artículo 150.2 de la Constitución como instrumento de 
ampliación del ámbito competencial autonómico”, 26-27.
72. On this subject, see Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law. The following fragment seems emblem-
atic to that end: “At a minimum, the procedural requirements of the rule of law prohibit the 
government from acting in an entirely ad hoc arbitrary fashion”, p. 95. On non-arbitrariness 
as a crucial element of the rule of law see also Saunders, “Interpretative rules with legislative 
effect: an analysis for public participation”, p. 350, legislative rules may be set aside only if 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law… [or] 
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”. 
73. For a discussion on the scope and significance of the “imperio de la ley” under the Spanish 
Constitution, see Clavero, “Imperio de la ley, regla del derecho y tópica de Constitución”, 41-78 
and Laporta, El imperio de la ley.
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stated motivations that are anything but persuasive.74 This is problematic. 
The ACs’ ability to expand their powers under Article 150.2 cannot entirely 
be at the mercy of the national institutions. In the light of regional forces’ 
relevance, further legitimized by their historical roots, in the constitutional 
life of the Spanish State, the limitations of their spheres of liberty ought 
conceivably to require proper justification and well-founded legal arguments. 
6. The problem of regulating a referendum in 
Catalonia 
Having discussed the notions of constituent power and co-sovereignty and 
considered how those concepts interact with the principle of self-government 
and the “principio devolutivo” in the constitutional experience of Spain, still 
absent is any look at the unilateral 2017 Catalan referendum as an expres-
sion of an emerging constituent power and co-sovereignty of the Catalan 
people. To that end, we will first briefly outline the theoretical framework 
concerning this kind of referendum. Second, after having clarified the kind 
of referendum at hand we will consider its regulation. It is important to 
highlight the nexus between both aspects, as the nature of the referendum 
has (or should have) a strong bearing on its regulation. 
First and foremost, it is worth remembering that from a constitutional stand-
point the Catalan referendum requires us to address the issue of unilateral 
secession, since, contrary to other independence processes, the centre and the 
periphery in this case failed to strike a balance between their countervailing 
interests and reach any agreement over the issue of the plea for Catalonia’s 
independence.75 This longstanding issue has received much attention in the 
literature with a wide array of legal material, including — inter alia — legal 
doctrine, constitutional jurisprudence, (Catalan) parliamentary resolutions, 
74. In this perspective, see the report of the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, stating the fol-
lowing: “les raons adduïdes per les Corts per refusar les propostes van ser o pràcticament 
inexistents, per tautològiques, o d’una debilitat tal que la reiteració de la petició podria 
resultar perfectament justificable”, 54. For the debate on the last resolution by the Catalan 
Parliament see Diario de Sesiones, X legislature, no. 180, 8.04.2014. See also Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics, Tres informes de l’Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics sobre el pacte fiscal, les duplicitats i 
les consultes populars, 431-437.
75. See in this sense also Bossacoma and López Bofill, “The secession of Catalonia”, 107 ff.
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and reports from institutional and non-institutional research centres. At the 
risk of simplifying a more complex matter in this scenario, two visions of 
the independence process compete with one another. On the one hand, the 
Catalan Government, armed with the approval of a broad segment of the 
legal scholarship, accepts the legal challenges and political backlash of a uni-
lateral referendum, relying upon the existence of the people of Catalonia’s 
right to decide on their constitutional future. As it has been rightly pointed 
out, the right to decide has two meanings: the right of Catalans to hold a 
referendum and the right to secede should a majority of voters cast their 
ballot in favour of independence.76 Based on the first meaning, the right to 
decide has legal relevance despite its lack of inclusion in any specific legal 
provision. Its defenders argue that this interpretation is indeed very much 
intertwined with the theory of the constitutionalization of new rights.77 
Despite the possibility that the Catalan people will hold a referendum on 
the region’s independence in the absence of a legal framework, scholars sup-
porting the right to decide argue that its normative force can be traced to 
constitutional principles inscribed in the Spanish Constitution, such as the 
democratic principle (Article 1 CE), freedom of speech (Article 20) and the 
right to participate in public affairs (Art. 23).78 Furthermore, comparative 
law and numerous international legal documents and jurisprudence plea in 
favour of a normative — rather than political — account of this right, which 
ultimately works to strengthen the position.79 Furthermore, according to the 
prevailing doctrine, a unilateral secession would fall outside the scope of this 
right.80 Lengthy disputes of this position have been articulated by large seg-
ments of the Spanish doctrine and, the legal strength of the right to decide 
has been undercut by the Spanish Constitutional Court’s determination that 
independence referendums represent not a right but rather mere political 
76. Barceló, “El Dret a decidir”. 
77. Ibidem. “Se trata de un derecho no positivizado. No existe ninguna referencia explícita 
a él en la legislación interna o internacional”.
78. Barceló, “El Dret a decidir”: “El que s’ha articulat a Catalunya com dret a decidir, doncs, 
no és més que una formulació de drets que ja existeixen constitucionalment en un estat 
democràtic”, 1. 
79. Ibidem.
80. Ibidem: “No tendría el efecto de una secesión unilateral para el territorio proponente; 
porque el principio de constitucionalidad y de primacía del derecho exigen en este proceso 
la presencia del titular de la soberanía de acuerdo con el art. 1.2 CE”.
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ambition.81 In particular, one possibly overlooked objection to the right to 
decide is the countermajoritarian question, which relates to the problem of 
internal political, social and linguistic minorities in Catalonia that do not 
want to secede or — at least — demand a more articulated and inclusive 
process. One could argue that, were the referendum to be regulated without 
any quorum or qualified majorities, the position of non-seceding forces in 
Catalonia would be severely affected. Thus, the seceding movement, which 
represents a minority within Spain, would impose a sort of unequal power 
relationship on the Catalan territory. Lastly, it could be said that with uni-
lateral secession now in process, the theory of the right to decide is unfit to 
properly frame the current situation. 
This paper has sought to go beyond the above-mentioned positions, exploring 
the so-called theory of the right to decide and some of its principal coun-
ter-arguments. It seems indeed that both positions share a common weakness 
in that they stake the resolution of the Catalan claim on a purely legal vision, 
failing to account for the crucial aspect at stake in secession processes, i.e. 
constituent power and the related issue of sovereignty. Whereas the attempt 
to emphasize legal aspects over legitimacy is clearer in the case of opponents 
of the theory of the right to decide, a similar feature also characterizes the 
arguments of right-to-decide supporters. In defending the constitutionality of 
the right to decide, the question of whether there is legitimacy in celebrating 
a referendum and separating from Spain is eclipsed by the attention afforded 
to the analysis of the constitutional norms underpinning the theory. It might 
even be argued that pro-right-to-decide positions have deliberately or, say, 
strategically abandoned this aspect, relying instead on the existence of a con-
stitutional right as a more convincing political strategy. Such is made clear in 
a recent contribution from Aláez Corral, adding a measure of depth to that 
perspective. In the words of Corral, “el derecho a la secesión del que aquí se 
habla no pretende ser un derecho prejurídico que conservan las entidades 
territoriales federadas como inherente a una soberanía de la que carecen, ni 
al ejercicio de un poder constituyente originario por parte de estas, sino la 
expresión democrática de la voluntad popular de seccionarse bajo las ciertas 
condiciones legales reconocidas por un sistema constitucional federal a una 
parte de los ciudadanos del Estado para garantizar la máxima estabilidad 
81. The TC defines the right to decide as an “aspiración política” in the judgement STC 
42/2015, FJ no. 4. 
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y eficacia del ordenamiento jurídico”.82 This position essentially draws its 
strength from a discourse based purely on legality. By contrast, it would 
seem that the issue at stake must be framed first and foremost theoretically, 
emphasising the relevance of legitimacy in such a context.
In particular, many defenders of the right to decide tend to draw a rigid distinc-
tion between the moment in which the right to decide will be exercised and the 
constituent process that will take place thereafter if a majority of voters cast 
their ballot for independence.83 In other words, a constituent process will be 
triggered once the people of Catalonia are allowed political expression. How-
ever, even assuming this position to be acceptable in the context of a negotiated 
referendum, it has no place when the solution is a unilateral path to secession, as 
this is a non-legal instrument that would operate outside any legal framework. 
From the opposing viewpoint, the right to decide has been stripped of its 
legal force. In particular, the Spanish Constitutional Court has disputed the 
legal nature of the right to decide, qualifying it as a political aspiration whose 
exercise is subject to the will of the people of Spain, i.e. its potential consid-
eration is conditioned on prior constitutional reform.84 Interesting to note 
in this context is the relationship between constituent power and what is 
perhaps one of the most emblematic reflections of the Catalan institutions’ 
will to trigger an independence process, i.e. the declaration of sovereignty 
approved by the parliament of Catalonia.85 In the STC 42/2014, the TC — 
after acceding to a review of the merits of that declaration and despite its 
non-legal nature — 86 considered the resolution in question unconstitutional 
because — inter alia — it represented “an act of constituent power” and 
82. Aláez Corral, “Constitucionalizar la secesión para armonizar la legalidad constitucional 
y el principio democrático en estados territorialmente descentralizados como España”, 136. 
83. See Institut Estudis Autonòmics, Informe sobre els procediments legals a través dels 
quals els ciutadans i les ciutadanes de Catalunya poden ser consultats sobre llur futur polític 
col·lectiu, 2013. The link between the right to decide and the beginning of the constituent 
process may be dated back to the Resolution 1/X1 expressing the will of the majority of the 
Catalan Parliament to trigger the independence process. The Resolution was challenged by 
the Government before the TC and declared unconstitutional (STC 259/2015). 
84. See STC 103/2008, FJ 4, quoted above at fn 20.
85. Resolución 5/X del Parlamento de Cataluña, por la que se aprueba la Declaración de 
soberanía y del derecho a decidir del pueblo de Cataluña. 
86. For a critical appraisal, see J. Vintrò, El Tribunal Constitucional y el derecho a decidir de 
Cataluña: una reflexión sobre la STC de 25 de marzo de 2014 — Joan Vintró, https://eapc-rcdp.
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thus contradicted the Spanish Constitution (and, according to the TC, the 
Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, as well).87 In that ruling, the TC also of-
fered an interesting definition of constituent power, qualifying the Spanish 
people as an “unidad ideal de imputación del poder constituyente y, como 
tal, fundamento de la Constitución y del Ordenamiento jurídico y origen 
de cualquier poder político”. This definition deserves careful attention. It is 
perhaps not a stretch to deem monistic or static the vision of the people as 
constituent power it puts forth. In fact, when a part of that people repeatedly 
calls into question such “ideal unity” the State must respond accordingly. In 
short, the Catalan independence claim has been addressed thus far in two 
ways. First, by resisting its labelling as a constituent process, instead focusing 
attention on the democratic evolution of the right to self-determination in 
liberal democracies. Second, in view of the declaration of certain specified 
acts as unconstitutional (propositions of the Catalan Parliament, the 2014 
“consulta”), the constitutionality of acts undermining the unitary essence of 
the constituent power remains a subject of debate.
That said, and considering the nature of the unilateral referendum, it seems 
important to highlight the nexus between the nature of the referendum and the 
regulation of the same. The relevance of that nexus was moreover underscored 
some years ago by the Venice Commission, which, in the context of the Monte-
negro referendum, declared the suitability of participation quorums insofar as 
the referendum at issue addressed a crucial issue, such as the independence of 
the country.88 In particular, meditations on how such referendums are regulat-
ed now become all the more topical. During this paper’s drafting, the Cata-
blog.gencat.cat/2014/04/02/el-tribunal-constitucional-y-el-derecho-a-decidir-de-cataluna-
una-reflexion-sobre-la-stc-de-25-de-marzo-de-2014-joan-vintro/. 
87. See STC 32/2015, FJ 2: “El significado esencial de la Declaración estriba en que el Parla-
mento de Cataluña, que ‘representa al pueblo de Cataluña’ (art. 55.1 EAC), declara soberano al 
pueblo catalán (‘Declaración de soberanía y del derecho a decidir del pueblo de Cataluña’) y, 
consecuentemente, el pueblo catalán, por sí solo, tiene derecho —todo en presente indicativo: 
‘en términos de efectividad actual e incondicionada’ y ‘como una realidad actual y efectiva’ 
dice el Consejo de Estado— a ‘decidir su futuro político’ justamente porque es soberano 
como ‘sujeto político y jurídico’. Esta afirmación de soberanía del pueblo catalán —como 
un quid existente ‘de manera actual y efectiva’— es, ni más ni menos, que un acto de poder 
constituyente. Planteada en estos términos, el contenido de la declaración viola con total 
evidencia los arts. 1.2, 2, 9.1 y 168 CE y los arts. 1 y 2.4 EAC”.
88. Venice Commission, Opinion on the compatibility of the existing legislation in Monte-
negro Concerning the organization of referendums with applicable international standards: 
“it has to be taken into account that the proposed referendum is one dealing with the crucial 
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lan parliament approved the Law of the referendum of self-determination,89 
which included details about the unilateral referendum on independence 
from Spain held on October 1st.  
To begin with, some clarification of our concept of referendums is required. It 
goes without saying that they embody an extremely large spectrum of decisions. 
As such, it is necessary to focus attention on comparable instruments and expe-
riences. Review of current constituent and political science doctrine reveals in-
creasing interest in what have been called sovereignty referendums. The precise 
definition and scope of this label differ from one author to another.90 The recent 
definition offered by Mendez et al can be illustrative:91 the authors conceive of 
sovereignty referendums as “direct popular vote[s] on a reallocation of sover-
eignty between two territories”. However, for the purpose of this paper, an even 
more circumscribed formula seems appropriate, one in which referendums are 
understood as “constituent power” referendums or independence referendums 
as expressions of constituent power. This seems adequate for the following four 
reasons. First, to do so permits to us to exclude certain referendums that fall 
outside the scope of this work and that are sometimes considered by authors 
wrestling with sovereignty referendums, such as those related to the definition 
of borders between countries or those related to the adhesion to the EU/other 
supranational or international organizations. Second, the concept of constitu-
ent power appears better equipped to describe the process that accompanies 
the referendum and allows for a clearer conceptualization of referendums as 
a stage in the exercise of a new constituent power. Third, it seems preferable 
if our aim is to clarify the constitutional approach of this work. Indeed, as the 
category of sovereignty referendums is also adopted by political science theorists 
some confusion regarding the exact approach of this study may arise. Fourth, the 
potential Catalan referendum begs the question of whether a new constituent 
power is emerging and the conditions under which it is possible to speak about 
such an emergence. 
issue of the independence of the country”, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2005)041-e. 
89. Llei de referèndum d’autodeterminació. 
90. See Laponce, Le referendum. 
91. Mendez, and Germann, Contested sovereignty. 
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7. Conclusion
This article has sought to propose a different interpretation of constituent 
power and sovereignty in the Spanish constitution by first looking at how 
the unitary vision of constituent power and sovereignty have been challenged 
by legal scholars in the recent literature and then discussing its relevance 
for the Spanish constitutional reality. As the analysis illustrates, the issue of 
co-sovereignty and sub-state entities’ claims to constituent power in the new 
State emerged during the constituent debate. We have argued that despite the 
initial failure of such sub-state claims, several phases of the Spanish democ-
racy allow for a problematizing of the “allocation” of sovereignty. It is pos-
sible to identify the periodically resurfacing presence of latent or quiescent 
co-sovereignty during the evolution of the Estado Autonómico. Studying those 
phases, we reached the conclusion that the struggle to achieve recognition 
for those co-sovereignties, though not easily rejected, must be integrated in 
the political and constitutional discourse rather than disregarded or denied, 
for they are closely bound up in the principle of democracy. As seen in the 
second section, the co-sovereignty/democracy nexus appears to have concrete 
implications, as it lays the foundations for negotiation between the central 
State and a slice of its territory that yearns to recuperate or trigger acts ex-
pressing an alleged co-sovereignty. 
In this regard the need to “integrate” the struggle for the recognition of co-sover-
eignty into the political and constitutional discourse — and this, as an alternative 
to indifference or adversity — seems crucial. Many years ago Professor Solé Tura 
emphasized the risks of recognizing the right to self-determination, asserting 
that it would open the State up to attacks on its stability. In this perspective he 
posed the question: “Is it possible that a democratic State can sustain a constant 
threat of being disintegrated and a permanent institutional pressure?” There is 
no doubt that a legal recognition of a potential separation of one entity from 
the State may touch off an uncertain evolution in the institutional framework. 
That might appear particularly risky, especially at the beginning of a constitu-
tional transition. However, the lack of legal democratic pathways to give voice 
to identity-based and nationalist interests can give rise to serious drawbacks, as 
the evolution of nationalist claims in recent years in Spain illustrates. Whilst the 
interest of the State is to avoid pressures and threats by secessionist forces, the 
lack (or prohibition) of a legal framework for the right to self-determination is 
not necessarily the best device. Indeed, in ordinary circumstances neglecting to 
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legalize or constitutionalize the right to self-determination undoubtedly affords 
States protection against the power of secessionist forces. That, however, may 
not always be the case. In exceptional circumstances, when different political 
forces of a sub-state entity express their disaffection with the way in which 
the central State interprets the articulation of powers between the centre and 
the periphery, the lack of a legal framework on the right to self-determination 
might set off undesired effects. In that case, it is likely that the absence of a legal 
instrument may reinvigorate arguments of secessionist forces. Put another way, 
from the point of view of the State the dilemma appears thus: the existence of a 
legal framework governing the future of a sub-state entity opens the State up to 
continuous forms of contestation, albeit not necessarily aimed at separation from 
the State; at the same time, the lack of a legal framework and legal democratic 
instruments to give voice to sub-state claims is, especially under rigid constitu-
tions, also a work-around for sidestepping procedural options in channelling 
strong dissent emanating from sub-entities, prompting them, as this void does, 
to seek expression outside the constitutional order.
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